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Leaving the Big Deal: Consequences and Next Steps 
JONATHAN NABE and DAVID C. FOWLER 
Presenters 
 
Many libraries are facing difficult fiscal climates with serials inflation, budget 
cutbacks, and reductions in allocations requiring difficult collection management 
decisions. Libraries may find their flexibility to plan and react unduly restricted 
due to being contracted to one or more Big Deals, in which they are obligated to 
buy large, inflexible title lists from big publishers for a set price. This 
presentation discusses the experience of Southern Illinois University-Carbondale 
and the University of Oregon in leaving Big Deals, provides data on impacts on 
interlibrary loans, community response, and collection budgets, details the steps 
required before and after the decision, and describes the benefits that other 
libraries could achieve by following the example of these two members of the 
Association of Research Libraries. 
KEYWORDS   Big Deals, serials inflation, budget cuts, licensing, vendor negotiations, 
usage statistics 
 
The intent of this session, “Leaving the Big Deal: Consequences and Next Steps,” was to 
provide some level of comfort to those who are contemplating leaving Big Deals. The 
experiences of Southern Illinois University Carbondale (SIUC) and the University of Oregon 
(UO) should help provide that comfort. The consequences of leaving these deals have been less 
than what might be expected. Given this, the question arises, why are more institutions not 
making similar decisions? Why are Big Deals so persistent? The reluctance to take the big step 
may be tied to two chief concerns: perceived value, mostly measured in terms of download 
numbers, and fear of the reaction from the university community. Both of these concerns are 
overstated, as the experiences of these two institutions show. 
 
THE SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY - CARBONDALE EXPERIENCE  
SIUC is classified as a Carnegie high research university, and is part of the Southern 
Illinois University system, which includes a medical school, a law school, and a sister campus, 
SIU Edwardsville. SIUC offers thirty-two doctoral and professional programs and seventy-five 
Master’s programs. Total student enrollment for SIUC is just over 20,000. Morris Library is a 
member of the Association of Research Libraries, holds 2.8 million volumes, and has a 
collection budget of $5.3 million. 
 
Morris Library and the Big Deals 
SIUC’s Morris Library has a great deal of experience with ending Big Deals, as we have 
left three big deals in the last three years. These were agreements with Springer and Wiley, via 
the Greater Western Library Alliance (GWLA), and Elsevier, which involved Southern Illinois 
University Edwardsville (SIUE). The impacts of leaving are real in a number of areas, some 
obvious and predictable, some more subtle or unexpected. Five specific areas of impact were 
examined and form the basis of this presentation: lost access to titles; changes in interlibrary loan 
requests; reaction from the university community; impact on the collection budget; and impact 
on the library collection itself. 
 
Lost Access 
The loss in overall number of titles is significant. Specifically, patrons lost access to 
1,100 titles from Springer, 597 titles from Wiley, and 242 titles from Elsevier. In assessing the 
impact of these losses, download statistics from the year prior to departure from the respective 
deals were collected and analyzed. For the Springer titles, there were 10,000 downloads from the 
1,100 lost titles. For Wiley, there were 11,254 downloads for the 597 lost titles. For Elsevier, 
there were 19,452 downloads from the 242 lost titles. In total, there were 40,000 total downloads 
from non-subscribed titles in the year prior to departure from these three publishers. 
These numbers are significant, and it can be deceptively disheartening to lose this access. 
However, these numbers do not provide an accurate or complete assessment of the impact to the 
university community. More detailed examination of these numbers provides a clearer indication 
of the value of the non-subscribed titles contained within each of the Big Deals. 
For the Springer titles, eighty-two percent of the non-subscribed titles received one or 
fewer download per month. Further, thirty-five percent of these titles had no downloads in the 
year examined. For Wiley, these numbers were sixty-two percent and ten percent, respectively. 
For Elsevier, twenty-eight percent of the titles had one or fewer downloads in the year prior to 
departure from the Big Deal, and two titles received no downloads. These data clearly show that 
many of the non-subscribed titles were superfluous to the needs of the University community. 
 
Measuring Impact: Interlibrary Loan  
Other metrics help to provide a fuller picture of the impact. One way to measure the true 
impact is by the number of interlibrary loans (ILLs) filled for titles that were previously available 
via Big Deals. Interlibrary loans require staff time and can carry copyright fees, thus representing 
an actual impact on the library in terms of personnel and finances. Also, because of the effort 
required to initiate an ILL request, on the part of the requester, they represent a clearer indication 
of real need on the part of the patron. Therefore, ILLs are a reasonable measure of the true 
impact, on all parties, of leaving Big Deals. 
There are some limitations to the data available regarding interlibrary loans. Analysis of 
the Springer titles is incomplete, so only data on Wiley and Elsevier are presented here, and it 
should be noted that only one year of data is available. Since we still have archival access to the 
non-subscribed titles for the years in which we were participating members of the Big Deal, 
available ILL numbers are restricted to the current year of content. Lastly, because of various 
anomalies, such as complimentary access, it is not always possible to know if the university 
community has had access to a title, regardless of the information contained in our link resolver 
database. 
Nevertheless, the preliminary numbers are convincing. In examining the top 25 percent of 
Wiley and Elsevier titles, determined by the number of downloads in the prior year, the impact of 
departure on interlibrary loans is minimal. For Wiley, only 27 percent of the lost titles had at 
least one request in the year following departure. Further, only 9 percent had more than one 
request. For Elsevier, only 38 percent had at least one request, and only 20 percent had more than 
one.   
One interesting way to measure this impact is by comparing the download numbers in the 
final year of participation versus the interlibrary loans in the year post-departure.  For Wiley, of 
the 125 titles that comprised the top 25 percent (as measured by downloads), which had received 
a total of 7,770 downloads, there were 71 ILL requests. Interlibrary loan demand was thus 0.9 
percent of prior use. For Elsevier, there were 46 requests for the 61 titles, compared to 15,017 
downloads the prior year. Demand was thus 0.3 percent of prior use. 
These numbers deliver an important message: download statistics are not an accurate 
indicator of demand. They are inflated, through a number of variables. These include incidental 
use, such as when a user accesses an article without meaning to, or after accessing it, determines 
it to be of no use. Online articles are also subject to repeated use: when a user access an article 
once, and then finds it necessary to go back to read it again, perhaps revisiting it multiple times. 
The method of linking can also inflate use; for example, Elsevier takes users from links in 
Google and other sources directly to the HTML full text of an article, thus recording a download, 
regardless of whether the article is actually read or not. Another source of inflation is created by 
the mere convenience of the availability of the content, as users may simply be trying to 
maximize the number of references reported, without regard to the content itself. 
 
Reaction from the Community 
Community reaction to the lost access has been minimal. Thus far, there have been a 
handful of complaints. What response there has been tends to be uninformed, due to confusion 
between subscribed and non-subscribed titles, a predictable development from participation in 
Big Deals. This confusion illustrates that these cancellations present an opportunity to educate 
faculty on Big Deals, price increases, and all the issues of scholarly communication that 
librarians are familiar with.   
When protests do arise, they can typically be dealt with by presenting numbers such as 
those provided above, as well as cost-per-download figures for lost titles. For most titles, the 
latter figure provides a strong argument for not retaining them, because interlibrary loan presents 
much more economical means for providing access. Another persuasive technique is to present 
the alternatives to faculty, assuming library subscriptions are assigned to specific departments. 
Since our decision to leave the Big Deals coincided with a large journal cancellation project, it 
was possible to present to faculty the unappealing scenario of cutting other titles in order to start 
subscriptions to lost non-subscribed titles, a process necessary for meeting the target cancellation 
values assigned to each department. When this was necessary, or deemed desirable, the academic 
departments were unwilling or unable to volunteer such swaps.  
 
Measuring Impacts on the Budget and the Collections 
Protecting the collection budget was the immediate impetus for making the decision to 
leave the Big Deals. Leaving the three deals saved Morris Library almost $300,000 annually. 
This amount would have represented more than half of our fiscal year (FY) 2010 monograph 
funds. Even with the large cancellation project for 2010, resulting in an abnormally high budget 
for books, this amount would have been about one third of the FY 2011 monograph budget, still 
an enormous amount. Alternatively, if the decision had been made to cut more from our journal 
subscriptions, in order to protect the monograph budget, many other journals would have had to 
be cut, almost exclusively from smaller publishers, including university and society presses.  
This leads to the final area of impact, the library’s collection, specifically as to who will 
control it, and how. The impact on our ability to control our collection was enormous. The 
flexibility the Big Deal cancellation gave us was pivotal in our effort to provide a collection that 
the community needs. We were able to cancel 230 titles from Elsevier, Wiley, and Springer. This 
represented savings that did not have to be squeezed from somewhere else, either from smaller 
journal publishers, or from the monographs budget. In addition, we were able to swap titles, 
beyond what is typically allowed for in Big Deals, to provide a more appropriate collection for 
the SIUC community. This is important because academic programs change over time, as 
departments change, faculty come and go, and new programs are established. Because we had 
been tightly locked into a set subscription list for years with Big Deals, we were restricted in our 
ability to address these changes. The savings realized from our departure and our cancellations, 
while no substitute for badly-needed increases in funds, have been crucial for us. In the end, we 
are in a better position to provide a collection more suited to the needs of the university 
community.  
 
Moving Forward 
Making the decision to leave a Big Deal is not the end of the process. In fact, the end is 
just the beginning, as it is necessary to renegotiate arrangements with publishers for those titles 
still deemed essential for the institution. The Big Deal is a great deal for publishers, because it 
provides a guaranteed revenue stream, with significant annual increases. Consequently, 
renegotiations may start off from an unavoidable strain in the relationship. 
Reactions from publishers, unlike from the community, are noticeable and unambiguous. 
One publisher indicated that upon leaving, a 25 percent “content fee” would be applied to our 
subscriptions. This was not widely known at the time, and still may not be, that if a library ends a 
multiyear deal and cancels titles, this publisher will impose this heavy surcharge. Such a fee 
would have wiped out the value of our cancellations, and more. On top of this, there would have 
been no price cap, giving the publisher the opportunity to raise our base to any figure they 
determined.    
Another publisher presented a similar problem, in that leaving the deal carried an 
immediate large increase. This reflected a discrepancy in pricing inherent in Big Deals: as the 
years pass, the price paid for subscriptions moves further and further away from the list price. 
This is because with the price caps typical to a Big Deal, annual price increases are lower than 
the publishers’ official increase (indeed, this is one of the attractive aspects of a Big Deal). With 
this particular publisher, when we left the Big Deal, the list price became our new base price, a 
significant upfront cost for us.   
In fact, the stance taken by publishers is to make leaving so painful as to discourage an 
institution from taking that step. In our case, tied up with this was an absolute requirement that 
we be allowed to cancel subscriptions, at the level we felt necessary for the sake of our budget 
and our collection. This meant that the guaranteed revenue stream, based on a subscription 
package determined years before, with guaranteed annual increases and marginal cancellation 
allowances, would be changing. We were demanding to reduce our base, a demand we 
maintained throughout renegotiations. 
Negotiation can, and for us, did result in the removal of the worst terms of the publishers’ 
proposals. Partly this reflects the fact that ultimate control and power resides with the buyer, 
provided the buyer is willing to keep the money and do without the product. However, we found 
that ultimately it is necessary to compromise in order to minimize the impact of the changed 
terms proffered by the publishers. This took the form of new multiyear deals with price caps and 
little or no cancellation clauses. This was acceptable to us because we were able to make the cuts 
we needed and reduce our base, to find a new starting point for the new agreements. If we had 
not been willing to make such agreements, the immediate financial impact on our budget would 
have been significantly worse. 
 Enforcing License Agreements 
A final story from our experience may be informative. When SIUC did not renew the 
Springer/GWLA deal, the issue of archival access arose. At the time of the original contract, 
GWLA had managed to have a clause about archival access added, specifying that LOCKSS 
(Lots of Copies Keep Stuff Safe) was one acceptable means for achieving guaranteed archival 
access. Addressing archival access early on showed great foresight, and though they could not 
have realized it at the time, the negotiators who had it added had paved the way for ensuring 
Springer participation in LOCKSS. Near the end of our contract, Springer informed us they had 
not worked with LOCKSS in the past, and would not do so in the future. Eventually, after several 
discussions, this position was reiterated by their legal counsel at the time. A member of SIUC’s 
legal counsel was present for that conversation, as she had been kept current on the situation, and 
had supported our efforts to see that particular clause enforced. She drafted a document stating 
that we believed Springer to be in violation of the contract, and were quite prepared to pursue the 
issue. In the meantime, we also informed GWLA of our experience, and asked GWLA 
leadership to support our efforts and inform Springer of their intention to do so. The leadership 
did so, and also took the issue to the International Coalition of Library Consortia (ICOLC), for 
their support as well. In the end, Springer agreed to abide by the terms of the contract, and in 
2011 began making their content available for LOCKSS harvesting. This experience illustrates 
the kinds of unexpected issues that may arise for any institution leaving a Big Deal, and the need 
to be prepared to work for the enforcement of the terms of the expiring contract. This effort 
needs to be done before the expiration of the contract, after which time the recourse for 
addressing the issue may no longer be available.   
 Conclusions 
The experience of SIUC’s Morris Library in leaving Big Deals has implications for other 
institutions considering the same move. Our experience shows that use of non-subscribed titles is 
overvalued; that interlibrary loans will not skyrocket in any proportion to reported download 
numbers; that the community will not erupt in revolt; and that conversely, the savings to the 
budget are large and ultimately essential, and that leaving Big Deals allow libraries to provide a 
collection more suited to the institution and community. 
 
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OREGON 
The University of Oregon (UO), founded in 1876, is part of the Oregon University 
System (OUS). Oregon is classified as a Carnegie very high research university, and had a 2010-
2011 enrollment of 23,389 FTE students, including 19,534 undergraduate students, and 3,885 
graduate/doctoral students. The University operates 263 academic programs, a law school, and 
another 33 research centers and institutes. 
The University of Oregon Libraries are comprised of the central Knight Library, the 
Jacqua Law Library, a science library, a mathematics library, the architecture and allied arts 
library as well as the geographically-separated Portland Library and Learning Commons, which 
supports graduate programs in Oregon’s largest city, and the Oregon Institute of Marine Biology 
Library, which supports marine programs in Charleston, Oregon. The library held 3,138,936 
books and serials, including 291,531 electronic books and 74,487 current serials. Also, in 2010, 
patrons retrieved 2,468,633 full-text downloads (a figure that is rising annually) and made 
361,809 circulations of physical items (a number that continues to fall). The total budget of the 
UO Libraries in 2010 was $20,042,433 and the materials budget was $6,427,158. It is a member 
of the Greater Western Library Alliance and the Orbis-Cascade Alliance. 
 
The University of Oregon Libraries and the Big Deal 
The UO Libraries have participated in a number of Big Deals over the past several years, 
including Cambridge University Press journals, the e-Duke Scholarly Collection, Sage Premier 
Online and the two collections to be discussed here: Elsevier ScienceDirect and the Wiley Online 
Library. The Elsevier deal was initially brokered through the Orbis-Cascade Alliance, a 
collection of thirty-six large and small academic libraries in Oregon and Washington, and which 
includes UO, Oregon State University, the University of Washington and Washington State 
University. The Wiley deal was organized by the Greater Western Library Alliance, a 
consortium of thirty-two research libraries in the West and Midwest. 
 
The Financial Crisis and the University of Oregon 
During 2008-2009, the world was hit by one of biggest financial crises since the Great 
Depression, which had huge impacts on the nation and the world economy. As the State of 
Oregon and the Oregon University System initially grappled with the impacts, initially a twenty 
percent budget cut was imposed on the state portion of the University’s overall budget. The state 
presently provides only about nine percent of the University’s budget, but investments and 
endowments, major sources of income, also took big hits during this period, further reducing our 
ability to meet commitments in the existing budget. 
 The University was able to attack this problem in a number of ways, some by design and 
some by serendipity, including the raising of tuition rates by 7.5 percent in that time period (with 
more to come). In addition, the UO Foundation was near the close of a successful $853,000,000 
fund-raising campaign, which included several million dollars raised by the library itself. There 
were, however, state (and donor) restrictions on how donated money could be spent, how it could 
be invested and when interest disbursements could be made, which limited how much could be 
used to ease the immediate financial shortfalls.  
 On another front, the UO benefited greatly from the financial woes of our neighboring 
states’ even greater monetary woes, especially those of California’s, and in particular, those of 
the University of California system, where budget cuts have been deep, and tuition has risen at a 
far greater rate than ours. Partly as a result of this, student applications to the University have 
skyrocketed, and UO’s total enrollment has increased by approximately 2,000 students in the last 
two years, creating many new tuition dollars for us. 
 
Other Financial Pressures at the University of Oregon 
The recession was not the only pressure on the UO Libraries. Even had it not occurred, 
the Libraries still would have had to face the results of regularly accumulating serials inflation 
rates. Since 1993, the UO Libraries had had four major serials cancellation projects: 1993, 1995, 
2000, and 2004-2005, totaling $1.49 million. The Libraries had effected enough cancellations 
and reduced format duplication to a minimum following the last cancellation to delay further cuts 
for several years. At about the same time that the recession hit however, inflation had finally 
caught up with us, and 2008-2009 was coincidentally also targeted for what was intended to be a 
two-year serials cancellation project. Combined with the initial budget rescissions required by 
the State of Oregon and the Oregon University System, we would now have to achieve serials 
cuts of up to $1.2 million. 
 Breaking the Big Deals 
As we began to analyze the necessary dollar cuts versus the serials actually available to 
cut, it quickly became apparent that it would be impossible to meet our goals if we were to rely 
solely upon unattached titles from smaller, individual publishers that were not tied up in 
contractual Big Deal obligations. It was thus clear to us that some Big Deals would have to be 
broken. We looked at the various deals that we were involved with, and several were not good 
fits for numerous reasons, including size, available titles, scope of titles and the term of the 
license. It did become apparent however, for somewhat different reasons, that both Elsevier and 
Wiley would meet our criteria for breaking up some of our large deals. 
 
Breaking the Deal: Elsevier 
 As an initial matter, and specific only to the University of Oregon, we had also 
participated in an unmediated pay-per-view arrangement for Elsevier journals. This was initiated 
to address content loss concerns expressed by faculty after the 2004-2005 cancellation project, 
which had eliminated some titles that were at least moderately used by UO researchers, due to 
their high cost. At first, this was a cost-effective means of providing seamless access to users for 
otherwise unavailable titles. As time went on, however, more people were using the service, and 
we had to replenish the Elsevier deposit account at ever-faster rates. That factor, combined with 
several expensive instances of pay-per-view download abuses (hijacked student credentials, for 
example) caused us to terminate this service, and bank the savings towards required serials 
cancellation targets. 
 Once this step was accomplished, UO determined that, based upon cancellation target 
amounts, it was not feasible to remain a participant in the Orbis-Cascade Alliance-brokered 
Elsevier deal. In a sense, we had anticipated financial turmoil the previous year (due to serials 
inflation’s catching up with us though, not due to the yet-to-occur recession) and rather than sign 
the Alliance’s three-year deal with Elsevier, we opted to sign a one-year extension of the 
previous Alliance deal. This gave us an initial sense of having freedom to maneuver as we 
started evaluating our options. 
 We considered cancelling titles outright and going it alone on a UO-only subscription 
plan, but thought it could make sense to engage our academic partners at Oregon State 
University (OSU; only 45 minutes to the north of us) to develop a cooperative plan. After some 
initial concept meetings, we began to develop a statistical framework for evaluating our shared 
titles in terms of overall usage, cost per use and impact factors. 
 Before too long we also decided to extend an offer to the other large public university in 
Oregon, Portland State University (PSU), to join our efforts. They accepted the offer, and after 
statistics were expanded and revised to include PSU, we created what could be termed an “ideal” 
deal based on keeping the titles that represented 90 percent or more of our combined, overall 
usage within a proposed new arrangement, discarding most everything else (exceptions were 
made for certain important small-discipline niche titles that had importance to their areas not 
necessarily reflected by usage), as well as proposing target inflation rates and content fee figures. 
With these steps accomplished, we then felt we were ready to approach Elsevier with an initial 
proposal. 
 Elsevier’s initial reaction to this was to request three separate meetings with the 
individual leadership groups at the three libraries, which was viewed by all of us as an attempt at 
a possible “divide and conquer” strategy, and which was quickly denied by the three libraries. 
Elsevier was informed that the three schools would only negotiate together as a single unit. A 
few weeks later, during the summer of 2009, we held our first meeting with Elsevier 
representatives at the Portland State University Library, and we presented our initial proposal. 
 Although UO was contractually free to pursue its options at the end of 2009, OSU and 
PSU were both locked into three-year deals. In order to make any new arrangement work, our 
partner schools had to be released from their contracts. To their credit, Elsevier, apparently 
deciding that it would be in its best interests to make this deal work, did agree to abrogate their 
contracts, and subsequently accepted the three schools as a mini-consortium with which they 
would negotiate in good faith. 
 In order to make such a potential deal work, we would need to cut a combined eighteen 
percent of our combined subscription dollars with Elsevier. Elsevier chafed at that figure, and 
asked that we not exceed ten percent in cancellations. This caused a somewhat extended period 
of disagreement between the two sides, but eventually Elsevier offered to reduce the content fee 
for a potential joint deal (basically, a fee just for the right to access their titles). The fee was 
initially proposed at 25 percent; Elsevier eventually reduced it to 12.5 pecent. This reduction was 
substantial enough for us to recalculate cancellations and reduce our cuts from eighteen percent 
to fourteen percent. Elsevier agreed to this. It was further established by Elsevier, that one of 
their imprints, Cell Press, which represented a small, but significant subset of our titles, could not 
be included in the proposal, due to internal restrictions. We did not contest this. 
 A key element of the deal would be the construction of a uniform title list (UTL), which 
would be a set of non-subscribed titles that Elsevier would provide access to, at a significantly 
reduced price. This was based on a similar arrangement that the Orbis-Cascade Alliance had 
brokered with Elsevier in the old deal. Elsevier had no problems with continuing a UTL, but 
offered us a couple of different options; one would provide a UTL, a ten percent content fee, and 
which would provide for full sharing of titles between the schools. The downside to this option 
was that it reverted to a ten percent cancellation ceiling. We found that unacceptable. The second 
option provided the UTL, however with no sharing, a 12.5 percent content fee, and the 14 
percent cancellation ceiling. This was mostly acceptable, but we held a hard line on title sharing, 
and also requested three years of zero inflation.  Elsevier relented on the sharing, but rejected the 
inflation proposal; they countered with a three year deal with inflation rates beginning at 0 
percent, 2 percent the second year, and 5 percent the third year.  
 We accepted the basis of this deal, but given the uncertainty of the economy at the time, 
the schools decided that they would feel more comfortable with a two-year deal. All the parties 
agreed, and the agreement was eventually ratified. At the time of this presentation, the first two-
year deal is coming to a successful conclusion and we recently completed negotiations for a new 
three-year deal to go forward with. There will be no major title adjustments, and to the view of 
the UO Libraries, holds inflation to very reasonable levels. Elsevier had given consideration to 
offering us a new Big Deal in the form of their Freedom Collection, but to their credit, realized 
early on that this would not be a good fit for us. 
 
Post-Big Deal: Elsevier 
 Leaving the Orbis-Cascade deal, and creating a significantly downsized “medium deal,” 
ended up being a wise choice for us. At UO, we were spending $409,566 on Elsevier products 
before cuts. In 2010, our total spend was down to $361,689, representing an eleven percent cut at 
our institution. We project we will surpass the 2009 dollar amount again in 2014. We do also 
anticipate a stable serials budget through that year. It may last longer than that, but projections 
beyond that are naturally murky. The major budgetary impact with this downsizing then, was to 
buy us five years of stable serials budgets, the value of which cannot be underestimated,  
There was a coincidental, significant rise of ILL/document delivery requests experienced 
by the UO library (47%) at about the time the Elsevier cuts took hold. An analysis however, 
indicated that there was only a modest rise in those involving Elsevier titles. The larger overall 
increase was believed to have been caused by the near-simultaneous implementation of 
WorldCat Local at UO.  
There were very few student concerns noted after the downsizing, and only a modest 
amount of concern exhibited by faculty members. We attribute this largely to a continuous 
communication about the serials cancellations between the library’s subject specialists and their 
respective academic departments, and the involvement of teaching and research faculty in 
providing feedback about planned cancellations. The largest area of concern exhibited was from 
the chemistry and physics faculty, who have a number of high-cost and less cost-effective serial 
titles in their areas. The library has primarily addressed these concerns by promoting a very 
efficient ILL/document delivery operation, which can generally provide any requested article 
within 24 hours. Going forward, however, we are also examining the possibility of re-instituting 
a much smaller scale, mediated and subject-targeted pay-per-view project for these scientific 
fields. To date, this is just conceptual and there is not yet a clear way forward. 
The University of Oregon has no regrets about eliminating these titles, or about creating 
the smaller deal. Negative impacts have been minimal, and positive impacts, particularly on the 
budget, have been large and demonstrable. We believe our partners in the arrangement have had 
similar experiences. The keys to success for us were cooperation with our partners, 
communication with our customer base, and a large amount of front-end preparation, particularly 
analyzing and evaluating prospective titles, which in turn, greatly minimized the negative back-
end impacts, and in our view, made it a very successful experience. 
 
Breaking the Deal: Wiley 
The Elsevier cuts, while important, were not enough for UO to reach its cancellation 
goals however. Wiley, another of our biggest Big Deals, had a license that was due to expire at 
the end of 2009, so it automatically became a prime target for us to examine for further 
reductions. We briefly considered the prospect of pursuing an additional “medium deal” with 
OSU as a partner for the Wiley titles in late summer 2009. However, the work that was done to 
prepare for the Elsevier negotiations was considerable, and the negotiations took the better part 
of that summer. At this point, relatively late in the year, UO collection managers had expended a 
lot of energy on Elsevier, and felt that they did not much energy for another round of 
negotiations, not to mention the fact the time was short, and a new school year was about to start. 
We then decided to forego this option, and to simply eliminate the GWLA Wiley deal in 
its entirety. As such, we contacted our Wiley representative, and requested a single-institution 
enhanced access license. Wiley did comply with our request, with little protest. 
Our plan with Wiley was to cancel all titles on subscription with them, and then reorder 
only those determined to be financially and academically desirable. An additional complication 
was that Wiley and Blackwell had not yet merged their title lists, and our serials acquisitions 
personnel had to work with two lists, rather than one, to complete this project. Using a similar 
mechanism to the Elsevier evaluation, we decided to cancel 96 titles that were not cost effective 
for us, thus saving $166,103. We then re-ordered 278 titles, worth $353,513. Also, due to our 
exit from the deal, we lost access to several desirable shared titles that we had to resubscribe to. 
Our planned cancellations had to balance these additions out.  
 
Post-Big Deal: Wiley 
Since the termination of the Big Deal, our Wiley subscriptions have remained relatively 
stable. Blackwell titles are now fully integrated, and we still occasionally do find Wiley imprint 
titles that were missed, and which need to be folded into our single-institution license. Also, 
every year, there is a small but constant parade of title transfers in and transfers out, that netted, 
for example, an additional $10,000 in subscription costs in 2011. We spent $519,616 on our 
Wiley Big Deal in 2009. In 2010, that amount was reduced, as has been mentioned, to $351,567. 
We expect it will be at least three additional years, into 2014 or later before inflation has eaten 
the savings that we have achieved with these cancellations. 
We are left with 297 subscribed titles from Wiley, titles that passed cost per use and other 
impacts analysis. We retain limited post-cancellation access to 862 titles that had been held by 
our GWLA partners. December 2009 and January 2010 are common coverage end dates for 
these 862 titles, leaving a gap in current content that will only continue to grow wider as time 
goes on.  
There was, as was noted before, a noticeable increase in ILL rates coincidental with the 
date that these cancellations took effect. Like Elsevier, however, Wiley increases were modest, 
and the implementation of WorldCat Local was determined to be responsible for most of the 
increase.  
With respect to our Wiley titles, we have had virtually no complaints whatsoever from 
faculty or students, and this essentially ended up being a non-event from our customers’ point of 
view. We counted this Big Deal elimination as a great success for us, and again, attribute a large 
portion of that to the upfront preparation that we engaged in, in order to make the smartest, most 
sensible cancellations possible. 
 
Conclusions 
The University of Oregon cancelled one full Big Deal, and shrank a second one 
significantly. It required much thought, analysis, and effort by us and our partners, but in our 
view, we created a pair of very successful results out of a very scary and uncertain financial 
situation. We are not naïve, and understand that no matter how wildly successful this effort was, 
that sometime in the near future, be it in 2014, 2015 or 2016, we will have to cut again. We feel 
however, that we have established a sensible template for any future cuts, should it involve the 
cancellation of another Big Deal, or the contraction of one.  
We understand that making a major change such as this is a scary and difficult possibility 
for a library to consider. The status quo always seems safer, but it may not be smarter. We feel 
that other institutions who are contemplating a similar decision can benefit from our success, and 
know that they can succeed as well. Finally, although it is easy to vilify and demonize vendors as 
being “evil empires” and other such names, they can be willing to work with libraries to reach a 
mutually beneficial result. They may be looking initially at how to maximize profit, but smart 
vendors will know that some business is better than no business and will conclude that working 
with libraries is better for their bottom line, as opposed to working against them. 
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